holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held.
Locke was a follower of the 'corpuscular philosophy' of Boyle and others, 4 according to which the physical world is composed of a large number of solid atoms with size, shape, position, and motion or rest, but without colour, sound, odour, hardness, or heat. In saying that our ideas of the primary qualities of things 'resemble' qualities possessed by objects in the world but that our ideas of secondary qualities do not he was simply expressing the scientific view that everything that happens in the world, including our perceiving the colours, sounds, odours, and so on that we do, is caused by the action of physical particles possessing only primary qualities of the sort listed. We do have ideas of such qualities, and all objects do possess such qualities. But what, in an object, correspond to our ideas of secondary qualities are only the powers the object possesses, in virtue of the primary qualities of its fundamental parts, to produce certain ideas in sentient beings who come into contact with it. In advancing this view Locke was not concerned with the problem of how we can reliably tell that things really are as they appear to be, nor did he argue for the asymmetry between our ideas of primary qualities and those of secondary qualities on the ground that familiar facts about the 'relativity' of perception hold for the latter but not for the former. He simply supposed, quite reasonably, that only the kinds of qualities referred to in physical explanations 'are really in them,-whether any one's senses perceive them or no: and therefore may be called real [or original or primary] 5 qualities, because they really exist in those bodies '. 6 To understand Berkeley's response to this aspect of Locke's philosophy , it is not enough to select a few sentences that could be taken as an attack on ! something Locke might be supposed to have said. It is important first to ; see in general what Berkeley was up to, and then show in some detail how j his criticisms of Locke fit into it. . It has been widely supposed for some reason that Berkeley was primarily | concerned with what we have come to see as an epistemological problem of ' 'appearance' and 'reality'-with whether and how we can know how things 6 Locke, op. cit., II, viii, 17.
• 'really' are, as opposed to how they 'appear'. 7 But in fact he thought the main inadequacy of previous philosophies was their faulty notion of existence, and the first six sections of the Principles* in which the main topics for discussion are introduced, are concerned with the question of what exists and of what it is to exist. It is announced, with little or no direct argument, that unperceived existence is really unintelligible. Some of the illusory attractiveness of rival doctrines is attributed to the influence of the pernicious theory of abstract ideas, but Berkeley is most interested simply in laying his view before the reader. Some truths, after all, 'are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them' ( §6). In those early sections there is no attempt to explain how a person knows, on a particular occasion or in general, that 'those bodies that compose the mighty frame of the world' exist, or that they really have the properties they appear to have, or are ordinarily taken to have. There is no mention of such questions at all.
From the fact that the esse of sensible things is petdpi Berkeley concludes in §7 that 'there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives'. And for a fuller proof of this point he argues that sensible qualities cannot exist in an unperceiving thing, since they are really 'ideas perceived by sense', and it is impossible for an idea to exist in something that does not perceive. In his statement of this view Berkeley does not distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. The list he gives of sensible qualities ('that is, ideas perceived by sense') includes 'colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like'. The point is that all the qualities we perceive, since they are 'objects' of perception, must be ideas, and therefore exist only in so far as they are perceived.
In §8 he entertains a reply to this sweeping conclusion. It is granted that perhaps the ideas themselves do not exist 'without the mind', but nevertheless there might well be things 'like' our ideas, 'whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance'. Berkeley regards this 'hypothesis' or suggestion as unintelligible, and most of the rest of the positive part of the Principles, up to the objections he begins to consider in §34, is an attempt to expose in one way or another the absurdities involved in it. Its defects all derive from its central, but incoherent, assertion of unperceived and unperceiving existence.
T o r the idea that some such epistemological problem is at the heart of Berkeley's concern with primary and secondary qualities see, e.g., Popkin, op. cit, 238, 246; Warnock, op. cit., 99-100; Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 114-115; and perhaps Mandelbaum, op. cit., 3-4. For a convincing exception see M. R. Ayers, 'Substance, Reality, and the Great, Dead Philosophers', American f In §8 his response is that 'an idea can be like nothing but an idea', so the appeal to the alleged 'likeness' will be to no avail. Either the 'supposed originals or external things' are perceivable, and hence are ideas after all, and therefore do not exist in an unthinking substance, or else they are unperceivable and so can stand in no relations of resemblance to our ideas. Does it even make sense to say that a colour is like something invisible, or something hard or soft is like something intangible?
There are two things to notice about this argument, whatever one thinks about its cogency.
9 First, it says nothing about any problems involved in knowing that our ideas 'resemble' something existing in an unperceiving substance; what is in question is whether ideas 'can' resemble non-ideas, whether it is possible 'for us to conceive', or 'whether it be sense' to speak of, a likeness between them. And secondly, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities plays no role. That is not even mentioned until the next section. So Berkeley at this point is certainly not arguing that the reasons Locke (or anyone else) gave for thinking that our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble anything in the object show just as conclusively that our ideas of primary qualities do not resemble anything in the object either. It is the very idea of resemblance between ideas and non-ideas that is being questioned.
In §9 there is the first mention of those who distinguish between primary and secondary qualities and claim that the ideas of the latter are not 'resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived'. The distinction is introduced by Berkeley as a sophistication of, or a restriction on, the 'likeness' view expressed in §8. There the suggestion was that our ideas, which are admitted to have no existence 'without the mind', are nevertheless 'resemblances' of things existing 'without the mind in an unthinking substance'. In §9 the suggestion is that only some of our ideas resemble things existing 'without the mind'. Those who distinguish primary from secondary qualities acknowledge that our ideas of secondary qualities are not 'the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call "matter"'.
It is clear, then, that Berkeley understands those who distinguish between primary and secondary qualities to be committed to the existence of things unperceived, or to certain qualities existing 'in' something unperceived and unperceiving. That is the sense he usually gives to his much-used expression, 'without the mind'. The view he is going to reject is one that he takes to imply the denial of his own view that esse is per dpi or percipere, and that is what he'concentrates on. In his arguments against it in §9 and in § §10-13 he expresses no concern about whether we can tell that objects 'really' have the primary qualities they 'appear' to have, nor does he argue that we are unable to tell whether a particular object before us 'really' has the determinate size or shape it appears to have because of certain familiar facts about the 'relativity' of perception. There is no suggestion that Berkeley thought Locke had argued that way, or even that Locke was at all concerned with a problem about 'appearance and reality'.
Berkeley's argument in §9 merely repeats what he takes himself to have shown already:
But it is evident from what we have already shown that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. This is just the same dilemma that was presented in §8, now applied only to primary qualities: either they are perceivable, and therefore are ideas, and their esse is percipi, or else they are unperceivable and therefore cannot resemble our ideas. In neither case can it be said that primary qualities, so understood, exist 'in' an unperceiving substance.
The objection in §10 attempts to expose a different absurdity in the view that primary qualities exist in bodies, but colours, sounds, heat, cold, and the like do not. The point is that since it is impossible to conceive of a moving, extended body without also giving it some colour and other sensible qualities in addition to the primary ones, the two kinds of qualities are 'inseparably united' and are 'not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted' from one another. Berkeley might be expected to conclude that the philosophers' conception of colourless, soundless, etc., bodies is therefore simply incoherent, or unintelligible, or even that it does not represent anything that could possibly exist, but in fact he tries to exploit what he regards as an inconsistency in their view for his own ends. He relies on the fact, granted by his opposition, that sensible qualities like colours, sounds, heat, cold, and so on, do not exist 'without the mind'; for such qualities esse is percipi. He then argues that if the two kinds of qualities are 'inseparably united', and colours, sounds, etc., exist only when perceived, or 'in the mind', then the same must hold for the primary qualities also:
Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.
This argument, like its predecessors, attributes no concern with epistemological issues about appearance and reality to Locke, and it mentions no facts about the 'relativity' of perception of either primary or secondary qualities. It is designed to show that the primary qualities cannot be separated off from the others by virtue of existing 'without the mind' or unperceived. With respect to existence, all qualities are in the same boat. §i i is another attempt to show that extension, and derivatively, solidity, which cannot be conceived without extension, 'exists not in an unthinking substance'. Once again Berkeley tries to force on his opponent a distinction between perceived extension and unperceived extension and to show the former to be an idea and therefore to exist 'in the mind', and the latter to be incoherent. Perceived extension and motion allow of relative terms like 'great' and 'small', 'swift' and 'slow'. And such degrees are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies.
So extension with degrees of largeness, and motion with degrees of swiftness, must exist 'in the mind'. Berkeley thinks this leaves his opponent in an unsatisfactory position :
The extension, therefore, which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all.
Only the dreaded doctrine of abstract ideas, which would provide an idea of extension in general, or motion in general, would seem to promise a solution, but for reasons we need not go into Berkeley thinks that leads nowhere.
Again, this argument does not mention secondary qualities, and therefore does not exploit any alleged similarities between our ideas of them and our ideas of primary qualities. It is not an argument from the fact that our judgments of greatness or smallness vary 'as the frame or position of the organs of sense varies' to the conclusion that things have no size, or that we can never ascertain what their size is. Nor does it suppose that the view against which it is directed is one concerned with determining the 'real' extension of things as opposed to the extension they 'appear' to have. So I think there is still no evidence that Berkeley misunderstands Locke's views about primary and secondary qualities and our ideas of them.
§12 offers an argument about number that more or less exactly parallels the argument about extension and motion in §11, and §13 is hardly relevant to the dispute at all, being largely a denial by Berkeley that he possesses an idea of unity.
By the end of §13 of the Principles, then, Berkeley has given a number of arguments against the view that there are certain qualities that exist unperceived, or exist 'in' some unperceived and unperceiving substance. But only in §14 do we find the sentences that have seemed most strongly to support the standard interpretation of Berkeley's views and of his understanding of Locke. It begins with a clear indication that it is introducing additional considerations-something new and different from what has gone before: *54 I shall further add that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever.
I think there is some doubt about whether Berkeley includes Locke among the 'modern philosophers' here, but if he does have Locke in mind then it looks as if he has misunderstood him on at least one point. The 'manner' of proof ascribed to these philosophers is as follows:
Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.
If, as I think has been shown, Locke never supports his views about secondary qualities in this way, and if Berkeley is asserting here that he did, then he is mistaken.
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But the point in §14 is that the same kinds of reasons for which 'it is said' by 'modern philosophers' that heat and cold are 'not at all patterns of real beings existing in . . . corporeal substances', could be used to show the same thing about figure, extension, and motion:
Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various and cannot, therefore, be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind? And just as 'it is proved' that sweetness is not in the object because the same object, while remaining unaltered, can taste sweet at one time and bitter at another:
Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object? There is a definite ad hominem or conditional nature to this argument, and it is clear that Berkeley is to a considerable extent separating himself off from the 'modern philosophers' he has in mind. He makes his point 10 Popkin, op. cit., claims that Berkeley in §14 is advancing an argument he found in Bayle, and that Bayle in turn got it from Abbe Foucher, a 'sceptical' opponent of Descartes and Malebranche. Certainly Foucher did not have Locke's Essay in mind, and it is not obvious that Bayle did. Locke and Bayle are squarely in the 'atomist' tradition and do not use epistemological arguments from the 'sceptical' tradition to support their views about colours, odours, etc. Berkeley shows in §15 that he is aware that these 'sceptical' arguments do not prove what Bayle wanted them to prove. See below, pp. 156-157. both times rather tentatively, in the form of a question, rather than asserting confidently that primary qualities simply do not exist in external objects for the reasons given. He is careful at each point to say that 'modern philosophers prove . . .', 'it is said that heat and cold . . .', 'it is proved that sweetness.. .'. So he is not obviously endorsing those 'proofs'. He is arguing only that if they are thought to work for secondary qualities then it is equally reasonable to think that they work for primary qualities as well.
This comes out clearly in §15, where he sums up the point of the previous section:
In short, let anyone consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion.
We know that the non-endorsement is explicit here, that the insertion of 'which are thought manifestly to prove ..." is to be taken seriously as a disclaimer, since Berkeley immediately points out that the 'proofs' do not really establish what they have been thought to establish:
Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object.
This shows first of all that Berkeley did not think that 'Colour does not exist in outward objects' or 'Extension does not exist in outward objects' is established or proved by the fact that an object appears to have different colours and different sizes in different perceptual situations. I have tried to show that he never argues that way in the Principles prior to §14, and in §14 itself he mentions but does not endorse arguments to that effect given by others.
There is perhaps some reason to believe he mistakenly thought Locke was one of the 'modern philosophers' who had argued that way, but even if that is so, the conditional or ad hominem argument of §14 does not provide the only considerations he brings against Locke's views. What he says prior to that section indicates the kinds of objections he has to any view, including Locke's, which speaks of things existing unperceived, or existing 'in' an unperceiving substance. It is those earlier arguments he is referring to in §15 when he says:
But the arguments foregoing plainly show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or, in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object. This is a much stronger conclusion than the claim that we can never know by sense what is the true colour or extension of an outward object. It amounts to the view that for all sensible qualities whatsoever, esse is percipi. An 'outward' object as Berkeley understands it here is an object that exists 'without the mind', or in other words, unperceived. Locke's view is to be rejected because it requires the existence of such objects, or of qualities existing 'in' something unperceived. That is the view Berkeley wants to demolish, and he sees perfectly clearly that it is not demolished simply by the fact that apples or pennies look to be different colours and different sizes in different perceptual situations.
Even if Berkeley did mistakenly think that Locke had argued that way about secondary qualities, he nevertheless shows that in another way he understands Locke's conclusions correctly. In criticizing the 'modern philosophers' by pointing out that perceptual 'relativity' shows at most that we can never 'know by sense' what the true colour or extension of the object is, Berkeley shows that he takes the 'modern philosophers' to be interested in something stronger than that epistemic conclusion. His criticism is that their arguments do not succeed in showing that 'there is no extension or colour in an outward object', and that would be a relevant criticism only if that were the conclusion they wanted their arguments to prove. So even if Berkeley did include Locke among the 'modern philosophers' here, it is clear that he did not take him to be primarily concerned to answer only an epistemological question about whether or how we can accurately ascertain the true qualities of an object.
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No such question is at stake in Berkeley's discussion of primary and secondary qualities in § §9-15 of the Principles; those sections amount to an exposition and defence of the view that esse is percipi or percipere. Putative ways around that doctrine are suggested, most of them made from the standpoint of the standard or 'received' view of the scientific philosophers, and all suggestions are rejected for relying in one way or another on the incoherent notion of unperceived existence, or the existence of something 'in' an unperceived, unperceiving thing. The discussion continues in the next two sections with a more detailed examination of what is there called 'the received opinion'. And once again its real deficiencies are not hard to discover:
But why should we trouble ourselves any further in discussing this material substratum or support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy and altogether inconceivable? ( §17).
11 If Berkeley admits in the Principles that an object's feeling cold to one hand and hot to another does not prove that there is no heat or cold in it, then why did he use so many similar arguments from perceptual 'relativity' to establish that esse is percipi in the Dialogues three years later? The question is raised and discussed by Tipton, op. cit., 39-41, 237-240.1 try to answer the question below, pp. 162-163, in discussing the Dialogues. This is a frontal attack on the central notion of the scientific philosophers; it is not merely the complaint that on their view certain things would remain unknowable.
Berkeley does go on, starting in §18, to raise questions about how the existence of such things as material substances could be known. But in doing so he does not mention the distinction between primary and secondary qualities or our ideas of them. And what he does say about the knowability of material substances in § §18-20 is concerned with whether and how things that are 'without the mind could be known. By 'without the mind' he means 'unperceived'; anything that existed 'without the mind' would be a counter-example to 'Esse is perdpi or percipere'. Since he thinks everyone will agree that the senses alone provide knowledge only of things that are immediately perceived and not of things that exist unperceived, the questions he raises about the knowability of things 'without the mind' are not about the knowability of familiar things like tables and trees, or of the way things 'really' are, as opposed to how they 'appear'. 12 What he questions is the 'connection' between allegedly unperceived, unperceiving substances and the things that we do perceive. He argues that there is no necessary connection between them, in the sense that we cannot deduce from any fact about an unperceived, unperceiving thing the conclusion that it produces such-and-such ideas in the mind. 13 Nor can there be any intelligible causal connection between them, if that means that the nature or characteristics of the unperceiving substance comprehensibly explain or account for its producing the ideas it does. 14 This is not to say that for Berkeley there can be no explanation of how and why we get the ideas we do. His present point is only that no intelligible explanation can be found in an appeal to an unperceiving thing that is said to cause our ideas. There are certain 'laws of nature' in accordance with 12 Further evidence that this was not his main concern is offered below, p. i6 3 ff. 13 Locke would agree with this. See, e.g., Locke, op. cit., II, viii, 13, where he speaks of God annexing certain ideas to certain motions, and of the possibility of God's acting otherwise.
14 Locke would agree. He thinks the structure and relations of the minute, insensible particles of a thing are causally responsible for the thing's having the qualities that it does, and for its producing the effects that it does, including those effects that are ideas in the minds of perceivers. But he admits that:
Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I understand; and motions from thence continued to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible. This I can resolve only into the good pleasure of God, whose ways are past rinding out (Locke, 'An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God', in Works, VIII (London: 1794), 217). which our ideas come and go, and Berkeley has every reason to promote the discovery of more and more such 'laws ' . 15 But what we learn in those discoveries is simply that 'such-and-such ideas are attended with such-andsuch other ideas in the ordinary course of things' ( §30), and that is not to discover any 'necessary connection between our ideas' ( §31), or to discover any power or agency in them. For Berkeley all the things we perceive are ideas, and ideas themselves are completely 'inactive':
A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything; . . . ( §25).
When we discover correlations between two sorts of perceivable things, then, we are not discovering that things of one sort are the causes of things of the other sort, since all causes are active.
This line of thought is what is responsible for the differences between Berkeley and Locke about the causation of our ideas. It might look as if Berkeley is simply denying Locke's own scientific account, or perhaps even denying that a scientific account can be given, when he concludes from the last-quoted passage:
Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles must certainly be false ( §25).
But that 'follows' simply because nothing that is not active can cause anything. Locke's corpuscularian view, which is quite clearly what Berkeley is referring to here, is to be rejected because it conflicts with the principles that only minds are active and can cause things, and that esse is percipi or percipere. If what Locke thinks of as the causes of our ideas are perceivable then they must themselves be ideas and hence, strictly speaking, not causes; or else they must be unperceivable, and either that is unintelligible or it implies that the causes are active things. 16 But that does not rule out a scientific study of perception; it only imposes constraints on how that study is to be understood. 15 He believes that increasing our knowledge of the 'laws of nature' is a way of increasing our knowledge and appreciation of the wisdom and beneficence of the Author of Nature ( §66). Even such a committed 'mechanical philosopher' as Boyle would agree. See his 'The Christian Virtuoso' in Works, V, 514, 515. 16 Berkeley's objection is therefore based on something more complicated than a certain simple 'view of the relation between philosophy and science' favoured by 'epistemologists' who wish 'to free philosophic questions from any direct dependence upon science' (Mandelbaum, op. cit, 3-4). What is at issue is, at least, the proper conception of causality, and how an 'inactive' thing could cause anything.
This last alternative-that the causes of our ideas are active-is pretty clearly what Berkeley had in mind in various entries in his Philosophical Commentaries^ which try to locate the real source of the differences between Locke's views and his own. For example:
282 Bodies etc. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken in a twofold sense-Collections of thoughts & Collections of powers to cause those thoughts. These later exist, tho perhaps a parte rei it may be one simple perfect power.
He had raised the same question earlier:
84 Powers Quaere whether more or one onely?
And he expressed greater confidence in the answer later:
838 Every sensation of mind w ch happens in Consequence of the general, known Laws of nature & is from without i.e. independent of my Will demonstrates the Being of a God, i.e. of an unextended incorporeal Spirit w ch is omniscient, omnipotent, etc.
Similar thoughts are expressed more fully in Principles § §28-33, where Berkeley first advances his views about the causation of our ideas, and are exploited later, especially in § §50-66, when he discusses the relations between his views and the mechanical philosophy. That philosophy is not to be rejected because the 'laws of nature' it discovers about perceivable things are false, but because it relies on 'inactive' causes or on unperceivable -and hence for Berkeley non-existent-entities or qualities.
After the interlude about the knowability of material substances in § §18-20 Berkeley returns to his main theme, the defence of 'Esse is per dpi or percipere'. And in § §22-23 he gives the famous argument that it is impossible even to conceive of anything at all existing unperceived or 'without the mind'. It is clear why Berkeley is 'content to put the whole upon this issue'. 'The whole' point for which he has been arguing is that unperceived existence is impossible, and if he can demonstrate it 'with the utmost evidence in a line or two to anyone that is capable of the least reflection', he will have succeeded in the single most important aim of his philosophizing. That is the main conclusion he wanted to explain and defend all along, and I have tried to show that it is only in connection with that thesis that Berkeley's whole discussion of primary and secondary qualities in the Principles is to be understood. Seen in that light, it is clearly and intentionally directed against a view that Locke actually held. (p. 106). And it is clear from the beginning that once again the aim is to show that what philosophers call 'material substance' does not exist, and that no absurd or sceptical consequences follow from its denial. It is to be rejected because it conflicts with the doctrine that esse is per dpi or percipere. Berkeley proceeds more methodically and consecutively here than he did in the Principles. He does not simply state his view and then explain and defend it; he tries to establish it step by step, gaining concessions on apparently uncontroversial points and then revealing as time goes on that there is nothing left to be conceded, that his whole theory of existence has been established. That procedure fits more easily into dialogue form, and it is not surprising that it should be used by someone disappointed by the immediate rejection of his first effort on the subject.
The first general step is to establish that for 'sensible things', esse is percipi. That is a thesis about existence, and Philonous undertakes to prove it for each kind of sensible quality in turn. He proceeds systematically through the different kinds of sensible qualities, heat and cold, tastes, odours, sounds, and colours, arguing in each case that at any rate the perceived heat, taste, colour, etc., exists 'only in the mind' or only in so far as it is perceived. Hylas keeps finding himself driven to invoke some mysterious unperceivable quality in order to avoid the conclusion that esse is percipi.
After having conceded that none of the sensible qualities so far considered has any existence 'without the mind' Hylas introduces in his defence the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. As in the Principles, it is clear that it is introduced as a sophisticated or restricted version of the view that all the qualities we perceive have an existence 'without the mind'. Given the primary-secondary distinction, it can be argued that only some do. And again it is clear that extension, figure, etc., are to be thought of as existing 'without the mind' in the sense of being 'inherent in external, unthinking substances' (p. 127). That is still Berkeley's target; it is the place at which Locke's view of primary qualities comes into direct conflict with the doctrine that esse is percipi or percipere.
When Hylas first introduces the distinction Philonous asks 'But what if the same arguments which are brought against secondary qualities will hold good against these also?' (p. 127). Since he goes on actually to present arguments in the case of each kind of primary quality against its existence 'without the mind', it cannot be said that Berkeley is arguing simply that if secondary qualities can be shown by certain arguments not to exist 'without the mind' then the same kinds of arguments can show that the same holds for the primary qualities. That conditional plays no role in Berkeley's actual procedure, since he goes on to give direct arguments for each kind of quality. Philonous's question is nothing more than an announcement of the course the ensuing discussion is to take.
Furthermore, when Philonous refers to 'the . . . arguments which are brought against secondary qualities' he is obviously referring to the very arguments he himself has just given to show that sensible tastes, colours, and so on, have no existence 'without the mind'. He is not simply referring in a sweeping manner to the 'method of arguing' of the 'modern philosophers', as in the Principles, or to 'those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind'. Here we know exactly what sorts of arguments he has in mind, because he has just given them. It is true that some (but by no means all) of the arguments given so far in the Dialogues do turn in part on facts about the 'relativity' of perception, and that the arguments given later against the primary qualities invoke similar considerations, 18 so it looks as if Philonous is indeed referring to the same sort of arguments as Berkeley attributed to the 'modern philosophers' in the Principles. And we saw that Berkeley thought such a method of argument 'does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object'. But I think there is no inconsistency here.
Berkeley thinks that facts about the 'relativity' of perception can be used to prove that perceived colour or perceived extension do not exist 'without the mind', and hence that those facts can be used to establish, as in the Dialogues, the thesis 'For sensible things, esse is percipV. But that alone does not prove quite generally that 'there is no extension or colour in an outward object', or the thesis 'For everything that is not a mind, esse ispercipi'. Berkeley of course believes the stronger conclusion, but he does not believe it solely on the ground that all the things we can ever perceive are such that their esse is percipi. He also believes that the notion of unperceived existence is incoherent or unintelligible, and that the only things of whose existence it makes sense to speak are either perceived or perceiving things. That does not follow simply from the fact that the things we do perceive are such that their esse is percipi. The 'relativity' arguments can therefore be used to establish that for sensible things, esse is percipi, without establishing by themselves the stronger conclusion that no qualities at all exist in 'outward' objects. In the step-by-step procedure of the dialogue form Hylas is slowly brought to concede the former while having to adopt more and more desperate measures to avoid the latter.
The subsequent discussion of whether the primary qualities are 'inherent in external unthinking substances' parallels the earlier arguments about the secondary qualities in almost every respect, except that in this case considerations about the 'relativity' of perception play a more prominent role. 19 The aim is always to establish that at least the perceived extension, figure, and so on does not and cannot exist in an unthinking substance. That is why Hylas is led to concede that, for example, 'the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance' (p. 127). That might look like the incredible view that we always accurately ascertain the true shape and size of the objects we perceive, or that our perception of the primary qualities of things is always completely reliable. 20 But the reliability or accuracy of our perception of primary qualities is not in question, and there is no attempt to refute the ridiculous view that our perception of the sizes or shapes of things is always reliable. What is being refuted is the view that what is perceived exists in an 'outward object or material substance', i.e. in something that exists 'without the mind' or unperceived. And that refutation holds just as much for colours and sounds as it does for extension and figure.
That Berkeley is not concerned here with questions about reliably or accurately ascertaining how things 'really' are as opposed to how they 'appear' is also clear from an exchange later in the first Dialogue in which Hylas tries to argue that even if one's 'sensation' cannot exist 'without the mind', still it does not follow that the 'object' cannot. Again Philonous has little difficulty convincing him that the 'object' he has in mind must be the perceived object, the object of the senses. And Philonous, Berkeley's spokesman, raises no scruples against saying that both primary and secondary qualities are 'in' that object:
Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but that any immediate object of the senses-that is any idea, or combination of ideas-should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the His sense of the unnatural, contrived allure of the 'materialist hypothesis' is perhaps best expressed in another entry in Philosophical Commentaries:
392 There are men who say there are insensible extensions, there are others who say the Wall is not white, the fire is not hot &c We Irish men cannot attain to these truths.
Hylas employs various suspect distinctions or notions in the rest of the first Dialogue in an attempt to grant that the esse of sensible things is per dpi without having to conclude that in general esse is percipi. He tries to distinguish between what is perceived and what causes the ideas we get, or between sensible extension and 'absolute' extension. He tries to distinguish the 'object' from the 'sensation', or the act of sensation from its object. Philonous shows that none of these attempts succeed in giving a sense to unperceived existence, and Hylas is forced once more to revert to the notion of a material substratum, which he claims is needed because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a 'support'. It is not difficult to show that this is not literally true and that no explanation has been given of what the metaphor is intended to convey.
Once again Berkeley, in the person of Philonous, is 'content to put the whole upon' the issue of whether it is possible to conceive 'any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind' (p. 140). He can rest everything on that question, as in the Principles, because that is what he has been concerned to establish all along, viz. that esse is percipi or percipere. That is a stronger conclusion than 'For sensible things, esse is percipi'; he thinks he has already established, or has been conceded, that weaker conclusion. The 'conceivability' argument, if successful, would establish the stronger conclusion once and for all, and it would doom to failure in one fell swoop all further attempts to grant that sensible qualities exist only "in the mind' while insisting that certain unperceived or unperceivable qualities nevertheless have an independent existence in 'outward' objects. The argument plays the same role as in the Principles, and for the same reasons.
I conclude that Berkeley's discussion of primary and secondary qualities in the Dialogues differs in no essential respects from his treatment in the Principles, and that in neither case does it rest on any serious misunderstanding of Locke's views on the subject. In both Berkeley's works the discussion occurs in the midst of attempts to support or defend the view that esse is percipi or percipere, and Locke's view of primary qualities is attacked for its commitment to the existence of unperceived things or qualities. The only possible evidence for any misunderstanding comes from Berkeley's remarks about the 'modern philosophers', and that would show at most that he wrongly supposed that Locke had argued in a certain way; it would not amount to a misunderstanding of what Locke's views about primary and secondary qualities actually were. And even that minor misunderstanding could be attributed to Berkeley only if it could be shown that he was including Locke among the 'modern philosophers' who argued from the fact that the same body can feel cold to one hand and hot to another to the conclusion that there is no heat or cold in the object. Berkeley thinks the argument is invalid. Locke never argues in that way, nor does Berkeley, and I think the preponderance of the evidence shows that Berkeley never thought that he did.
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